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■ Washington Whispers ■[®]

Richard Helms, holder of one of the most sensitive jobs in Washington as Director of Central Intelligence, got some unsolicited praise the other day from Senators who have been critical of his agency in the past. For example, Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee said in a recent closed session that Mr. Helms has "inspired in us confidence and trust."

Inside Washington

CIA's Helms Wins Senate Doves' OK

By ROBERT S. ALLEN and
JOHN A. GOLDSMITH

WASHINGTON—It is hard to believe, but Richard Helms, director of the much-criticized Central Intelligence Agency, has become a darling of the Senate doves.

A career intelligence officer, with CIA since its founding in 1947, Helms was named director by President Johnson in 1966. President Nixon renewed the appointment early this year.

In subordinate posts Helms had seen CIA blamed abroad and at home, for goofs of all proportions. He served under two colorful and much-publicized directors of central intelligence, gentleman-spy Allen W. Dulles and hard-driving industrialist John A. McCone.

Now it is being said — and by the most critical of the Senate doves — that career-man Helms has brought a new respectability to the quiet campus-like CIA headquarters in Langley.

Exhibit A in this regard is Sen. Mike Mansfield, Mont., the Senate Democratic leader. Mansfield has been a frequent critic of Vietnam policies and of other aspects of national security planning by two administrations.

For years Mansfield has, in addition, been a leader of a so-far unsuccessful drive to apply a tighter congressional oversight to CIA activities. Yet Mansfield says Helms "has brought a respectability and integrity to the CIA...and given it the kind of standing which it lacked prior to the time he took over."

"I must say, like all those who have come in contact with him, I have been tremendously impressed. I think he is by far the best director the CIA has ever had. Because of Mr. Helms that agency's integrity and standing have increased considerably, at least in the congressional community," says Mansfield.

ALSO FULBRIGHT — Mansfield made those comments in the Senate's secret debate on the ABM Safeguard system weeks ago. The transcript of that debate, censored and reviewed, was made public only last week. CIA data was quoted by both sides in the secret discussion, but Safeguard opponents stressed the agency's finding, made without further evaluation or comparison, that Russia had suspended work on its anti-missile system.

"APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS"

— Helms has always enjoyed the confidence of the rather hawkish senior members of the House and Senate who ride herd on CIA operations through special intelligence subcommittees. There is therefore, a real significance in his present high standing among the agency's long-time critics.

He has, in the first place, made it clear that, as the nation's top intelligence officer, he will provide the best possible reading, without bias and without trying to evaluate events abroad against developments (weapon or otherwise) in the United States. In short, Helms will provide the best available basis for U.S. policies without trying to make them.

CIA critics were never sure that Dulles and McCone were willing to stop at that.

With respect to CIA's operational responsibilities, those shadowy clandestine activities which have provoked most of CIA's criticism over the years, Helms has carefully lived up to a pledge made during his Senate confirmation hearings in 1966:

"Sir," said Helms on that occasion, "the Central Intelligence Agency takes no actions without approval from the appropriate officials of the U.S. Government, and they are not in the CIA."

After more than three years, CIA's critics are beginning to believe him.

Suit Involving CIA And Agent Is Dismissed Again

By GERALD A. FITZGERALD

A federal judge in Baltimore dismissed for the second time yesterday a \$110,000 slander suit that forced the Central Intelligence Agency to acknowledge an Estonian refugee now living in Hyattsville as one of its agents.

However, the suit has revealed little more about the secret intelligence agency's operations during the five years it has been before the federal courts.

The suit was filed in 1964 by Eric Heine, a 49-year-old lecturer now residing in Canada, who claimed that the agent, Juri Raus, had discredited him among Estonian emigre organizations by labeling him a "dispatched Soviet intelligence operative, a KGB agent."

The warning, which both Mr. Raus and the CIA have admitted, was delivered on three separate occasions in 1963 at meetings of refugees in this country.

The case was first decided on December 8, 1966 by Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, who agreed with the government's position that Mr. Raus held immunity from damage suits based on actions he undertook in his capacity as a government intelligence agent.

The judge ruled that the agency was further protected from suit by what he said was its privilege to protect state secrets.

The Fourth United States Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, which reopened the case in July, 1968, said that it agreed with Judge Thomsen's main conclusions, but wished to have additional evidence on record to resolve a doubtful factual point.

The agency director's affidavits to the court stated that Mr. Raus acted under instructions, which the appellate court said "implied" that the instructions were given by someone authorized to do so, and ultimately in a position to claim executive privilege from suit.

However, the record still carried the "permissible inference that (the) instructions were given by an unauthorized underling, and that the action has never had the approval of a responsible official of the agency," the court said.

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HELMS FILES CIA AFFIDAVIT

Court To Rule On Agency's Part In Slander Case

By THEODORE W. HENDRICKS

The director of the Central Intelligence Agency admitted in a Federal Court affidavit filed here yesterday that he lacked personal fore knowledge of a move by the agency to brand an Estonian emigre as a Communist agent.

At the same time, however, Richard Helms, who now heads the supersecret spy agency, said that he had reviewed the entire matter afterward and had "ratified and approved" the action.

The statements were made in the sixth affidavit filed by Mr. Helms arising out of a slander suit brought by Eerik Heine of Rexdale, Canada, who claims that his reputation was ruined by the CIA action.

Mr. Heine sued Juris Raus, now an employee of the Bureau of Public Roads who lives in Hyattsville, Md., for \$110,000, but the case was thrown out because of the CIA's refusal to tell the court about the instructions it had given to Mr. Raus.

The CIA has admitted only that Mr. Raus was agency operative and that he had received instruction designed to prevent Estonian emigre groups from being infiltrated by Soviet agents.

Because the CIA had invoked privileges on national security grounds and had ordered Mr. Raus not to testify under penalty of death, the \$110,000 slander suit was thrown out before it came to trial.

Case Ordered Reopened
The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the case reopened for a limited purpose. The appellate court ruled that the CIA director must state clearly whether or not he had authorized instructions to Mr. Raus.

Chief Judge Roszel C. Thomsen must now rule on whether the statements made by Mr. Helms are sufficient to satisfy the appeals-court ruling.

Mr. Heine claims that he was once a freedom fighter in Estonia and that he had made a reputation since escaping from the Russian-dominated country by lecturing on anti-Communist activities and by showing a film he made called "Creators of Legend."

At a 1963 meeting of Estonian groups in New York, Mr. Heine charges, Mr. Raus, who was also an Estonian emigre, denounced him as a "dispatched Soviet intelligence operative, a KGB agent."

"Absolute Privilege"

At that time Mr. Raus was national commander of the Legion of Estonian Liberation. The CIA later admitted that it had furnished Mr. Raus with information designed to protect foreign intelligence sources.

The government spy agency asserted that it had an "absolute privilege" to refuse to reveal the source of its information and revealed that Mr. Raus had signed a death oath to prevent him from testifying.

In an earlier opinion, Judge Thomsen pointed out that a slander suit could not be tried, because Mr. Raus would stand "weaponless before his adversary" in a court trial where the CIA invoked its privilege to silence Mr. Raus.

Although the court of appeals upheld this decision, the case was sent back so that the CIA could affirm that it authorized instructions to Mr. Raus.

No Vindication

Without this authorization, it was indicated, the CIA could not raise the executive privilege designed to protect its files.

As for Mr. Heine, dismissal of the case would mean that he would have no opportunity to vindicate himself from charges that he had assumed another man's identity to spy on Estonian groups.

Whether Judge Thomsen will require a further court hearing on the case or rule on the newly submitted affidavit has not yet been determined.

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BY STEWART ALSOP



WHY ARE THE RUSSIANS SCARED?

WASHINGTON—A few days before President Nixon returned to Washington last week, a major state paper was delivered to him in California. The paper gave the answer of the Board of National Estimates to this question: is there a serious danger of war between the Soviet Union and Communist China? The board's answer, in non-governmentese: indeed there is.

The paper was prepared, of course, before Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's surprise trip to Peking to talk with Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai. The Kosygin trip may—or may not—have reduced the danger, but it is evidence that the danger is taken very seriously indeed in Moscow.

The Board of National Estimates represents Washington's "intelligence community"—the CIA, plus the Pentagon's DIA, the State Department's intelligence branch, and the other bureaucracies in the immense Washington paraphernalia of intelligence. Most of the board's "national estimates" are festooned with dissents. Significantly, to this paper there were no dissents at all.

Only a few months ago, the consensus of the intelligence community was that the chances of a Sino-Soviet war, despite the bitter rhetoric on both sides, were near zero. The intermittent fighting this summer along the frontier—the Russians charge that no fewer than 488 Chinese border violations have been repulsed by the Soviet Army since June—has of course influenced the changed assessment of the danger. So has the mounting evidence, reinforced by Kosygin's trip to Peking, that the Russians themselves take the danger with deadly seriousness.

GENUINE DANGER

In recent months, to cite one example, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin has gone out of his way, not once but several times, to warn Secretary of State William Rogers that the danger of war is very real. In terms of nuclear power, air power, fire power—all forms of power except man power—the Russians are almost as superior to the Chinese as this country is to, say, the Mexicans. This raises an obvious question: why, in heaven's name, are the Russians scared of the Chinese?

According to the experts in such matters, the answer falls into four parts: First, history. The Tartars held Russia in thrall for 240 years. Ever since,

the Russian people have had a sort of folk fear of attack from the east.

Second, geography. The Trans-Siberian Railway runs in some places less than 10 miles from the Chinese border. It is the only land link between European Russia and Asiatic Russia. To cut it would be to cut Russia in two.

Third, mystery, always a component of fear. The Russians really do not know what the Chinese are up to. In the open Western countries, the KGB, the Soviet equivalent of the CIA, has an easy assignment, but in China it has more than met its match. The Soviet diplomatic mission in Peking is so isolated that it might just as well be locked up in Moscow's Lubianka prison.

WHAT ARE THEY?

The Soviet Union, of course, like the U.S., stages reconnaissance and spy-satellite flights over China. But these flights do not really dispel the mystery, as a recent, rather amusing exchange between a CIA man and a KGB man in Washington suggests.

The two met at a diplomatic reception. The CIA man, a China specialist, knew that the KGB man specialized in the same field (the identity of the KGB men under diplomatic cover is, of course, known to the CIA). After a bit of chit-chat, the CIA man brought up a subject that has mystified the CIA—the large numbers of big, beehive-shaped installations that appear in reconnaissance pictures of North China. The CIA knows they are not missile installations, but has no clue to what they really are.

The CIA man asked casually whether the KGB man had noticed these curious objects. But of course, the KGB man replied, somewhat nettled—and proved it by displaying detailed knowledge of what the beehives looked like, and where they were. And what, the CIA man asked even more casually, did his colleague think the purpose of the installations might be?

"But we have no idea—no idea at all," said the KGB man, with a mixture of indignation and chagrin. By the same token, Soviet intelligence has "no idea at all" of what Chinese intentions really are. This makes the Russians deeply uneasy and is an important element in the Russian fear of China.

The fourth and most important reason for the Russian fear of China is that, although they are more polite about it,

Nikita Khrushchev's successors undoubtedly share Khrushchev's view that the Chinese Communist leaders are irrational—Khrushchev called them "madmen" and "maniacs."

There is, indeed, a lunatic quality about the Chinese Communists' ideological assault on the "Russian revisionists." Tass, the Russian news agency, collects examples of anti-Russian propaganda. One recent item concerned a 4-year-old girl who had been performing her "anti-revisionist dance" poorly, until inspired by the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, when she became the best anti-revisionist dancer in her age group. The Russians would not worry very much about anti-revisionist dances if they were not aware that the Chinese Communists are acquiring more lethal means of expressing their hatred.

The Chinese, as the Russians know all too well, have acquired a respectable nuclear arsenal, have already deployed medium-range missiles, and are working hard on the second stage of a missile with the range to devastate European Russia. The Russians also know that the sacred Maoist doctrine holds that a thermonuclear war—a war which, in Khrushchev's phrase, would "leave the living envying the dead"—is not only inevitable but desirable, to assure the final triumph of Mao-style Communism.

SHARED FEAR

The Russians' fear of a nuclear-armed China was shared by President Kennedy even before the Chinese acquired nuclear weapons. In 1963, he mused aloud about "a government that has called for war, international war, in order to advance the final success of the Communist cause . . . you introduce into this mix nuclear weapons and [you have] a more dangerous situation than we've faced since the end of the second world war."

Before he died, President Kennedy had secretly ordered a study of the feasibility of a "surgical operation" to accomplish the "nuclear sterilization" of Communist China. Since the nuclear weapons have been introduced "into this mix," it is not very surprising that the Russians should have considered the same thing. Moreover, they are not the only people with reason to fear a nuclear-armed China. Fear of nuclear weapons in irrational hands is not an irrational fear.

BALTIMORE SUN

1 SEP 1969

Peace-War Gamesmanship

Ernest B. Furgurson

Washington.

The best-laid plans of the most careful presidents can go awry, while the chief executive is down at the ranch or, as currently, out on the coast. While Mr. Nixon is vacationing at San Clemente, his underlings are back here making hash of his intention of having his administration speak as one on matters of high and delicate policy.

It might be fun if it didn't involve things like war and peace, life and death and nuclear strikes.

The State Department says the North Vietnamese infiltration rate into the south lately is overbalanced by its casualty rate on the battlefield. This, it concludes, is significant.

The Defense Department says Hanoi sent about 100,000 troops below the border in the first half of this year, thus "substantially replacing" its losses.

A day later, the Pentagon takes a little of the sting out of its earlier statement. Both State and Defense agree on the infiltration figures involved, it says. But the Pentagon points out that State is not considering the presence of numerous enemy troops in Laotian and Cambodian sanctuaries, nor the rate of its continuing recruitment from the bottom of the native manpower barrel in the enemy-controlled south.

What is at issue, the press con-

cludes, is not the arithmetic but the conclusions drawn from it.

The Pentagon's vested interest is in keeping enough American forces available to fight the enemy in country, in sanctuaries and on the way. Minimizing enemy strength is not the way to do it.

The State Department's current interest is in fulfilling the President's political interest—which is in getting American troops out of Vietnam.

By terms laid down by the President himself, our withdrawals must be tied to one of three developments: progress in the peace talks at Paris, a decrease in the level of enemy activity, or an increase in the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.

The first increment of 25,000 Americans now has departed. The rationale for that many withdrawals was that Saigon's armed forces were not only more numerous now, but also better equipped and somewhat better led.

Announcement of another pullout of ten thousand troops was planned for mid-August. But the enemy did not co-operate. Just about that time he started several battles and harassments, and the United States casualty rate swung upward again. Mr. Nixon's desire to announce another withdrawal package, based on Paris progress or enemy relaxation, was frustrated.

He wants to pull out more, perhaps 35,000 this time, but he has to be able to justify it. The State Department was doing its best to help him in that direction, by making much of the lower infiltration rate, when the Pentagon disagreed.

State, through Henry Cabot Lodge, the chief negotiator at Paris, is practically begging the enemy to say formally that the apparent decline in infiltration is an intentional de-escalation of its war effort. But the enemy won't, even when we point out that we have cut back on B-52 raids as a carrot to tempt him into reciprocating.

So for the moment the President is stuck. But he'll find a way. Stanley Resor, the Secretary of the Army, may have tipped it off as he left Saigon the other day. He said the "Vietnamization" of the war was running ahead of schedule, although the South Vietnamese army still is short of trained leaders and expects to take further steps toward logistical self-support. It won't be entirely satisfactory to Mr. Nixon to base the second

withdrawal installment on the same grounds as the first, but for his purposes that is better than not moving at all. A little closer orchestration of his departmental spokesman might make it more palatable, though.

While State and Defense were having their innings about Vietnam, the agency that usually isn't there accidentally surfaced into public view by circulating a rumor that is widely considered to be ill-advised. That was the one about the Soviet Union's querying its allies for their reaction to a possible Russian strike at China's nuclear installations.

It came from Richard Helms, the director of the CIA. He had one of those background luncheons with a half-dozen reporters, in which the newsmen may write what they are told, but not attribute it to anybody specific. But the New York Times, which by habit makes a good thing of such leaks, had a case of sour grapes because it was not at the luncheon, and fingered Helms as the source. He was embarrassed.

Peking and Moscow both feigned fury. The Chinese said we were ganging up with the Russians on them. The Russians said any nuclear war inevitably would reach every continent. How the exercise helped our situation with the strategic arms talks coming up, or in any other way, is unclear.

It is clear, however, that this sort of goings-on was considered very recently to be symptomatic of a "credibility gap" in Washington.

Befuddling Backgrounders

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

News Analysis

Government officials are, as they say, red-faced. Some journalistic outsiders are understandably wroth. And, alas, the poor newspaper reader is muddled by it all.

Depending on which paper you read this week—or even which edition of which day—you might be alarmed at the prospect of a Sino-Soviet war. Or you may feel the danger is overrated.

You could believe, authoritatively, that the Green Berets are innocent and the Central Intelligence Agency guilty in the killing of a suspected Vietnamese spy. Or

you could agree with an equally authoritative and anonymous, newly circulated account that says precisely the reverse.

You may see hope, along with State Department spokesmen, in a "significant" drop-off of North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam. Or you may share the more dour view at the Pentagon that things haven't changed much.

You may have abandoned all hope for a "peace dividend," along with White House special assistant Dan-

iel P. Moynihan, or you may take the more sanguine view of other officials that new Nixon programs will shower post-Vietnam benefits on all Americans.

When he was campaigning for the presidency last fall, Richard M. Nixon promised to conduct an "open administration." This week it opened up with a vengeance.

The triggering event was a background lunch Monday at which the Green Beret episode and the prospects of a Soviet pre-emptive strike against Communist China's atomic plants were discussed.

The man who did the backgrounding was identi-

fied by The New York Times, The Washington Evening Star and Scripps-Howard as Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms. None of these news media was represented at the session.

Under the protocol for such sessions, all participants were to observe the "Lindley Rule."

This is a journalistic convention, named after former Newsweek columnist Ernest K. Lindley, under which the remarks of the briefer are in no way attributed and his identity is in no manner disclosed.

See FLAP, A5, Col. 1

Following the Monday session, stories appeared reflecting the growing alarm in the Nixon administration over the prospects of war between Russia and China. The stories cited reports reaching Washington that the Russians were sounding out Communist bloc countries and some western Communist leaders on their reaction to a Soviet strike.

Until that point the last administration statement on the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war was made by Secretary of State William P. Rogers on Aug. 20. He told State Department summer interns that he regarded it as unlikely.

The State Department was still clinging to that position yesterday. And Rogers was reported to be upset at the newly voiced—though clandestine—alarm about a Sino-Soviet war danger that was being blared in the headlines.

Yesterday, a second story surfaced in various newspaper, including The Washington Post. It was a new account—also unattributed—of the Green Beret murder in Vietnam.

According to this version, the CIA advised officers of the 5th Special Forces group at Nhatrang not to kill the suspected double agent, Thai Khac Chuyen. This account also asserted that seven Green Beret officers implicated in the episode lied to their superiors, claiming that the agent disappeared on a mission.

Previous accounts coming from Vietnam, often attributed to "sources close to the Green Berets," accused the CIA of issuing the order to kill the South Vietnamese agent.

One veteran government press officer, confounded by the flow of headlines in a week when the government was ostensibly taking a California vacation, greeted reporters at the State Department the other day with the waspish question:

"Where was the lunch?"

If the news consumer wasn't reeling with confusion at the rush of contradictory headlines, the infiltration flap was enough to finish him off.

It began with a speech in Madison, Wis., Tuesday night by former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who said there was "an almost total lack" of infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam recently and that this was a hopeful omen. (Rusk tried unsuccessfully to put these re-

marks off-the-record, even though he addressed 800 banking officials.)

The next morning, the State Department followed up with a statement, that North Vietnamese infiltration had decreased by a "significant" level. The Pentagon quickly countered that the decrease was slight, that no significance could be read into it and, furthermore, that the Communists were "substantially" replacing their battle casualties in South Vietnam.

Infiltration figures have always been a source of befuddlement not only to the public, but also to newsmen trained in the statistical artifices of the Pentagon and State Department.

For it is possible that infiltration may have gone, as Rusk indicated, to the zero point at the top of the pipeline in North Vietnam though a substantial number of North Vietnamese may still be pouring out of the bottom, through Laos and Cambodia.

No one made clear—publicly—whether Rusk, the State Department and the Pentagon were talking about the top or bottom of this pipeline. It was almost as though the issue was deliberately fuzzed.

Back in the civilian sector there was similar puzzlement. In the White House summer headquarters at San Clemente, Calif., on Monday that the President's urban affairs adviser, Moynihan, spoke of an era of tight budgets stretching beyond the end of the Vietnam war. By the next day's editions anonymous White House officials were pool-pooling the Moynihan claims.

There is only one casualty in this cross-barrage of conflicting claims and numbers. It is the hapless, vexed and bewildered reader.

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On Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf Coasts

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Soviets Deploying Missile Sub Fleet

By HENRY J. TAYLOR

Around U.S.

Our Central Intelligence Agency is newly concerned about the Soviet deployment of its missile submarines. It appears that the Kremlin intends to station these permanently along the entire Atlantic seaboard, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle on our Pacific Coast.

Traditionally, a navy's role has been to keep the sea lanes open. Russia's has been an exception. The Soviet navy began when the British gave Russia the World War II battleship *Royal Sovereign* and we gave Russia—totally on the cuff, of course—the great cruiser *Millwaukee*. These were Russia's only capital ships. Accordingly, the Red fleet was deployed defensively in the Baltic and along the Soviet sea borders on the Pacific side.

But, adopting our U.S. Navy's World War II pattern, the Kremlin has fundamentally revised the fleets' strategic role and changed it increasingly to an attack basis.

Meanwhile, Britain has dropped out of this costly competition. This leaves only two first-class naval powers in the world: the U.S. and the USSR. What Russia does we must do, and vice versa.

Beyond fast aircraft-carrier units, which Russia still lacks, the change has emphasized missile submarines, which cannot be tracked by radar or by sight and are not where they were even a few minutes ago.

Our Congress, in turn, has authorized 41 such submarines. Each carries 16 hydrogen missiles totaling 656 atomic warheads. Each warhead averages about three-megatons explosive power, aggregating 1.9 billion tons—yes, tons—of conventional explosives. This represents from the submarines alone roughly the entire weight of World War II bombs dropped on Germany.

Our Central Intelligence Agency estimates that the Red fleet now has not only more nuclear and conventional submarines than the United States, but more than the entire rest of the world combined.

CIA agents in the Soviet Union credit the sea arm with 425 submarines—390 conventional, 35 nuclear. They report them at present stationed chiefly off our coast on a round-trip basis and off Cuba, Red China and Australia. Incidentally, Red China has 30 Soviet-built submarines of her own.

Espionage has entered heavily into this Red fleet change to an attack capability. The Red agents in the convicted Konon Molody ("Gordon Lonsdale") spy ring with the British Admiralty obtained top-secret particulars about the U.S. Navy's Decca Tracking System and scooped up the top-secret data about Britain's "Dreadnaught" nuclear submarine project with which our Navy was cooperating. The Red ring likewise deeply penetrated our Navy's nuclear submarine base at Holy Loch, Scotland.

Moreover, a major utilization of the Red submarine fleet today is to deliver additional agents. Castro is among the important beneficiaries, and has been for a long time.

For example, Castro's leader for the Dominican Republic revolt was Domin-

ican Communist party executive committee member J. I. Quello. Quello, on a Castro mission to Russia, was secretly landed from there in a submarine to begin the attack. So was bloody-fisted Joaquin Ordoquin, Castro's No. 3 man, who was landed by a Soviet submarine from Caibarien, the main Soviet submarine port in Cuba, 190 miles east of Havana.

The Red fleet's change to an attack stance has also resulted in beefing up Castro's array of what the Kremlin calls the Lamda-75s. These fast vessels have a surprising 13.5-ton fuel capacity that gives them an action radius of 3,600 miles along our Caribbean coast.

Castro now has more than 100 Lamda-75s and other Russian varieties at sea. They are directed by Soviet naval officers from Matanzas, only 75 miles south of Key West, Fla.

Moreover, the CIA believes that during the recent visit of Soviet fleet units to Cuba the Russian admiral in command authorized a further expansion of the Soviet-expanded Chullian Shipyards in Havana Province.

The Russians also support Castro's crafts with far-flying Russian jets stationed chiefly at the Soviet air base at San Julian, 90 miles southeast of Havana, the island's largest air station. Each Soviet jet is capable of instant conversion into a bomber merely by attaching the bomb rack. And the CIA calculates that each is capable of launching a larger and more devastating atomic missile than is launched by a U.S. Polaris submarine.